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ABSTRACT 
 
     New West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Center (WCATWC) response criteria for earthquakes 
occurring  in  the  Pacific  basin  are  presented.    Initial  warning  decisions  are  based  on  earthquake 
location,  magnitude,  depth,  and  -  dependent  on  magnitude  -  either  distance  from  source  or  pre-
computed  threat  estimates  generated  from  tsunami  models.    The  new  criteria  will  help  limit  the 
geographical  extent  of  warnings  and  advisories  to  threatened  regions,  and  complement  the  new 
operational tsunami product suite.   
     Changes  to  the  previous  criteria  include:  adding  hypocentral  depth  dependence,  reducing 
geographical warning extent for the lower magnitude ranges, setting special criteria for areas not 
well-connected  to  the  open  ocean,  basing  warning  extent  on  pre-computed  threat  levels  versus 
tsunami travel time for very large events, including the new advisory product, using the advisory 
product for far-offshore events in the lower magnitude ranges, and specifying distances from the 
coast for on-shore events which may be tsunamigenic. 
      This report sets a baseline for response criteria used by the WCATWC considering its processing 
and observational data capabilities as well as its organizational requirements.  Criteria are set for 
tsunamis generated by earthquakes, which are by far the main cause of tsunami generation (either 
directly through sea floor displacement or indirectly by triggering of slumps).  As further research and 
development provides better tsunami source definition, observational data streams, and improved 
analysis tools, the criteria will continue to adjust.  Future lines of research and development capable 
of providing operational tsunami warning centers with better tools are discussed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
     Tsunami warning systems are different from most other natural hazard warning systems in that 
most systems are able to directly monitor the hazard for which they warn (for example, hurricanes, 
tornadoes, and solar storms). In order to provide information in a meaningful time frame, tsunami 
warning centers must issue warnings to the nearest coasts prior to observing the tsunami.  Initial 
warnings are normally based on seismic data which defines the tsunami source as opposed to wave 
measurements which define the tsunami.  However, seismic signal strength is not directly proportional 
to the tsunami strength.  This reality induces warning centers to use conservative warning protocols 
when basing warnings solely on seismic data.  
     The  NOAA/National  Geophysical  Data  Center’s  Tsunami  Database  (2007)  shows  that 
approximately 85% of tsunamis are generated by earthquake disturbance of the sea floor.  Many of the 
other tsunamis are generated by landslides that are often triggered by earthquake shaking.  At present, 
seismic data are the best immediate data available to characterize an earthquake’s potential to generate 
a tsunami prior to impact along the nearest coast.   
 
Figure 1. NOAA tsunami warning center area-of-responsibilities. 
 
     The purpose of this report is to refine criteria the warning center uses to issue tsunami messages in 
its Pacific area-of-responsibility (AOR – Figure 1).  This AOR consists of the coasts of California, 
Oregon, Washington, British Columbia, and Alaska.  Criteria are proposed for tsunamis generated 
both inside and outside the AOR.  The criteria address when alerts are issued, to which areas, and 
what level of alert is sent.  The term “alert” refers to tsunami warning, watch, and advisory which are 
defined later. 
 
2. TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER OPERATIONS 
     Two basic types of data are recorded at tsunami warning centers: seismic and sea level.  Data from 
approximately 300 seismometers are recorded at the WCATWC (Figure 2).  The center’s seismic data 
processing system is optimized to characterize large earthquakes as quickly as possible.  Normally, 
the first message concerning an event is based strictly on seismic data, as the wave will not have been 
measured yet on a sea level gage. 
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     After  the  initial  bulletin  is  issued,  seismic  data  are  further  analyzed  to  verify  the  magnitude, 
location, and depth, and to better characterize the event.  Moment tensor solutions are computed, and - 
through the USGS CISNDisplay software - ShakeMaps and regional moment tensor solutions are 
displayed when available.   
 
 
Figure 2. Diamonds represent seismometer locations recorded at the WCATWC. 
 
     Concurrent with secondary seismic data analysis, the center monitors sea level data (Figure 3).  
Two types of sea level data are available: coastal tide gage data and deep-ocean pressure sensor data 
(Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis - DART).  Since 2005, the amount and quality 
of both tide gage data and DART data has greatly improved.  These data are critical to verify the 
existence  of  tsunamis  and  to  calibrate  models  used  to  forecast  amplitudes  throughout  the  basin.  
Depending  on  the  source  location,  it  can  take  anywhere  from  30  minutes  to  3  hours  to  obtain 
sufficient sea level data to provide forecasts for wave heights outside the source zone, or to verify that 
no wave has occurred and cancel the alert.  Within the AOR, upgraded sea level networks have 
dropped the verification time to 30 minutes in some regions. 
     The WCATWC’s goal is to issue alerts in five minutes or less for events within the AOR (Figure 
4).  With this short response time, an analyst must quickly review events.  Procedures for the initial 
message must be well-planned in advance and set for all potential earthquakes.  Following the initial 
response, analyst judgment of the situation becomes a greater part of the procedures.  There are 
literally  an  infinite  number  of  different  scenarios  which  can  play  out  during  an  event,  and  it  is 
impossible to set procedures for all.   
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     For earthquakes magnitude 8 and over, the center’s initial magnitude estimate is often low since 
the  earthquake  may  have  not  finished  rupture  by  the  time  the  initial  processing  is  completed.  
Response criteria are set conservatively enough that the initial response will get an alert to those 
nearest the epicenter even with an under-estimated magnitude for earthquakes of this size.  
 
 
Figure 3. Diamonds represent coastal tide gages and squares represent DARTs recorded at the WCATWC. 
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Figure 4. WCATWC response time summary. Response time is defined as the time of bulletin issuance minus the 
earthquake’s origin time.  Decrease in response time has been made possible by the use of denser, broadband 
seismic networks, improved seismic analysis software, and 24x7 staffing of the center. 
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     After an alert is issued, messages are updated every 30 minutes or as necessary.  In the early stages 
of an event, there may be no sea level data to support analysis in these supplemental messages (often 
the case when the event is outside the AOR).  In these cases, secondary seismic analysis to better 
characterize the source can help guide warning center response. 
     Response time is mainly limited by seismic network density and distribution.  For example, a 
center can respond in five minutes with an accurate location and magnitude if the following network 
criteria are met (response is defined as the time of bulletin issuance minus the origin time of the 
earthquake): 
•  12 evenly-distributed seismic stations 
•  Within 900 km of the epicenter (2 minute P-wave travel time) 
•  80% station uptime 
•  Up to 30 seconds data latency (data transmission time) 
•  Digital, broadband seismic data (necessary to determine moment magnitudes) 
 
If these criteria are met, a typical timeline for warning center response would be: 
•  150 seconds to record signal on 9 to 10  stations 
•  60 seconds more to record enough P-wave signal for Mwp computations 
•  30 seconds extra for final analyst review 
•  60 seconds to compose and transmit appropriate message 
 
     Response  timelines  can  be  compressed  by  increasing  seismic  network  density,  reducing  data 
latency, or decreasing process time.  However, response time will reach a limit due to source process 
times for major earthquakes which can exceed 100 seconds and the fixed times of reviewing events 
and composing bulletins. 
 
3. TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGE SUITE 
     The WCATWC tsunami message suite has recently been revamped.  In short, it has progressed 
from a three-level suite to a four-level suite.  The products issued by the center are warning, watch, 
advisory,  and  information  statement.    Each  has  a  distinct  meaning  relating  to  local  emergency 
response.  In summary: 
 
Warning  ->  Inundating wave possible  ->  Full evacuation suggested 
Watch   ->  Danger level not yet known  ->   Stay alert for more info 
Advisory  ->  Strong currents likely    ->  Stay away from the shore 
Information  ->  Minor waves at most    ->  No action suggested 
 
     Based  on  seismic  data  analysis  or  forecasted  amplitude  (dependent  on  whether  the  center  has 
obtained sea level data), WCATWC will issue the appropriate product.  Warnings and Advisories 
suggest that action be taken.  Watches are issued to provide an early alert for areas that are distant 
from  the  wave  front,  but  may  have  danger.    Once  the  danger  level  is  determined,  the  watch  is 
upgraded to a warning or advisory, or canceled.  The full definition of each message is given below: 
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Tsunami  Warning  -  a  tsunami  warning  is  issued  when  a  potential  tsunami  with  significant  widespread 
inundation is imminent or expected. Warnings alert the public that widespread, dangerous coastal flooding  
accompanied by powerful currents is possible and may continue for several hours after arrival of the initial 
wave.  Warnings also alert emergency management officials to take action for the entire tsunami hazard zone.  
Appropriate actions to be taken by local officials may include the evacuation of low-lying coastal areas, and the 
repositioning of ships to deep waters when there is time to safely do so.  Warnings may be updated, adjusted 
geographically, downgraded, or canceled. To provide the earliest possible alert, initial warnings are normally 
based only on seismic information. 
 
Tsunami Watch - a tsunami watch is issued to alert emergency management officials and the public of an 
event which may later impact the watch area.  The watch area may be upgraded to a warning or advisory - or 
canceled - based on updated information and analysis. Therefore, emergency management officials and the 
public  should  prepare  to  take  action.   Watches  are  normally  issued based  on  seismic  information  without 
confirmation that a destructive tsunami is underway. 
 
Tsunami Advisory - a tsunami advisory is issued due to the threat of a potential tsunami which may produce 
strong currents or waves dangerous to those in or near the water.  Coastal regions historically prone to damage 
due to strong currents induced by tsunamis are at the greatest risk. The threat may continue for several hours 
after the arrival of the initial wave, but significant widespread inundation is not expected for areas under an 
advisory.  Appropriate actions to be taken by local officials may include closing beaches, evacuating harbors 
and marinas, and the repositioning of ships to deep waters when there is time to safely do so. Advisories are 
normally updated to continue the advisory, expand/contract affected areas, upgrade to a warning, or cancel the 
advisory. 
 
Tsunami  Information  Statement  -  a  tsunami  information  statement  is  issued  to  inform  emergency 
management officials and the public that an earthquake has occurred, or that a tsunami warning, watch or 
advisory has been issued for another section of the ocean.  In most cases, information statements are issued to 
indicate there is no threat of a destructive tsunami and to prevent unnecessary evacuations as the earthquake 
may have been felt in coastal areas. An information statement may, in appropriate situations, caution about the 
possibility of destructive local tsunamis.  Information statements may be re-issued with additional information, 
though normally these messages are not updated.  However, a watch, advisory or warning may be issued for the 
area, if necessary, after analysis and/or updated information becomes available. 
 
 
4 TSUNAMI AMPLITUDE VERSUS IMPACT 
     One important factor in determining which type of alert to issue is the impact expected from a 
certain size tsunami.  Here, tsunami size is described by amplitude, or the level of the wave above 
normal sea level.  Historic tide gage recordings or measured runup (the highest vertical extent of the 
wave along the shore) along with corresponding damage provides a relationship between amplitude 
and impact.  Table 1 shows a comparison of recorded tide gage amplitudes or measured runups and 
corresponding damage along the U.S. west and Alaskan coasts.   
 
Amplitude (m)  Location/Damage  Year 
0.35  Shemya, AK; no damage  1996 
0.4  Santa Barbara, CA; no damage  2006 
0.4  Yakutat, AK; no damage  1987 
0.45  Shemya, AK; no damage  2006 
0.5  San Francisco, CA; strong current stops ferry  1960  
 
  
 
  
0.5  Port Hueneme, CA; no damage  1957 
0.5  Crescent City, CA, no damage  1994 
0.5  Crescent City, CA; 1 mooring broke loose  1963 
0.5+  San Diego, CA; boat/dock damage  1957 
0.51  Adak, AK; no damage  1996 
0.55  Port Orford, OR; no damage  2006 
0.6  Arena Cove, CA; no damage  2006 
0.6  Port San Luis, CA; no damage  2006 
0.6  Ketchikan, AK; no damage  1964 
0.6  Los Angeles, CA; $200K damage to boats  1964 
0.6  Monterrey, CA; 2 almost drowned  1957 
0.6  Crescent City, CA, no damage  1968 
0.6  San Diego, CA; strong current, boat damage  1964 
0.7  Crescent City, CA; no damage  1957 
0.7  San Diego, CA; boat/pier damage (20 knot current)  1960 
0.8  Unga, AK; dock washed away  1946 
0.8  Port Hueneme, CA; railroad tracks flooded  1946 
0.8  San Pedro, CA; wharf flooded  1868 
0.8  Avila, CA; no damage  1927 
0.8  Santa Barbara, CA; no damage  1946 
0.8  Santa Barbara, CA; boat damage  1964 
0.8+  Los Angeles, CA; $1 million damage, 1 drowning  1960 
0.9  Crescent City, CA; $10M damage to docks  2006 
0.9  Yakutat, AK; Mooring torn loose  1958 
0.9  Adak, AK; no damage  1986 
0.9  Shemya, AK; no damage  1969 
0.9  Anaheim, CA; boats loose, no damage  1877 
0.9  Santa Cruz, CA; boats loose, no damage  1960 
0.9  Crescent City, no damage  1946 
0.9  Trinidad, CA; cars stuck on beach  1992 
1.0  San Pedro, CA; flooding, no damage  1877 
1.0  Crescent City, CA; 4 boats sunk  1952 
1.0  Cape Pole, AK; log boom broke  1960 
1-1.5  San Francisco Bay, CA; $1 million damage  1964 
1.1  Attu, AK; no damage  1969 
1.2  Seldovia, AK; $500K damage to boats  1964 
1.2  Larsen Bay, AK; warehouse flooded  1964 
1.2  Annette, AK; no damage  1964 
1.2  Seaside, OR; boats swept away  1946 
1.4  Avila, CA; no damage  1952 
1.4  Noyo River mouth, CA; several near drownings  1946 
1.4  Santa Barbara, CA; much damage  1960 
1.4  Ilwaco, WA; streets flooded  1964 
1.4  Gearhart, OR; houses flooded  1964 
1.5  Charleston, OR; no damage  1946 
1.5  Taholah, WA; boats swept away  1946 
1.5  Santa Cruz, CA; 1 dead, many rescued  1946 
1.5  Santa Cruz, CA; minor damage  1896 
1.5  Seaside, OR; boat/pier damage  1960 
1.5  Stinson Beach, CA; no damage  1960 
1.5  King Cove, AK; cannery damage  1946  
 
  
 
  
1.6  Attu, AK; minor damage  1965 
1.7  Crescent City, CA; boats sunk, pier damage, 3 injured  1960 
1.8  Surf, CA; railroad station inundated  1927 
1.9  Humboldt Bay, CA; some damage, flooding  1964 
1.9  Adak, AK; bridge, structure destroyed  1957 
2.0  Noyo Harbor, CA; boat/dock damage  1960 
2.0  Noyo Harbor, CA; 10 boats sunk  1964 
2.0  Copalis, WA; some injuries, much damage  1964 
2.2  Half Moon Bay, CA; 3 near drownings, flooding, boat damage  1960 
2.3  Umnak I. , AK; moorings destroyed  1957 
2.3  Montague I. , AK; minor damage  1960 
2.5  Pacific Beach, CA; injuries, damage  1964 
2.6  Half Moon Bay, CA; homes flooded  1946 
2.6  Drake’s Bay, CA; boat capsized  1946 
3.0  Santa Monica, CA; boat/pier damage  1930 
3.0  Redondo Beach, CA; 1 dead, many rescued  1930 
3.0  Seaside, OR; 1 dead, structural damage  1964 
3.0  Cape St. Elias, AK; 1 drowned  1964 
3.0+  Florence, OR; much damage  1964 
3.0+  Klamath River, CA; 1 dead, some damage  1964 
3.4  Gaviota, CA; ships run aground  1812 
3.4  Moclips, WA; houses damaged  1964 
3.5  DePoe Bay, OR; 4 deaths, some damage  1964 
3.7  Yakataga, AK; no damage reported  1964 
4.5  Wreck Creek, WA; minor damage  1964 
4.8  Crescent City, CA; 10 dead, $15 million damage  1964 
     
Table 1. Examples of tsunami amplitude or measured runup and resulting damage (Lander et al., 1993; Lander, 
1996, NGDC, 2007).  Amplitudes are taken from original tide gage records where possible.  There are many other 
recordings below 0.5m within the AOR.  None of these had any associated damage. 
 
     Table 1 indicates that tsunami damage due to strong currents can occur at amplitudes as low as 
0.5m.    More  severe  damage  and  inundation  tends  to  occur  in  the  1.5-2.0m  amplitude  range.  
Whitmore (2003) showed that tsunami amplitude forecast accuracy for events up to 1.5m amplitude is 
approximately 50%.  This general accuracy level was also observed during the November 15, 2006 
Kuril Islands tsunami for forecasts along the U.S. coast.  Based on this level of accuracy, the observed 
amplitude/impact relationship, and the tsunami product definitions, advisories will normally be issued 
when forecasts are in the range 0.3m to 1.0 m and warnings when the forecast is above 1.0m.  
 
5. WARNING CRITERIA 
     Tsunami response criteria can be based on historic event data.  Since significant tsunamis are 
uncommon events, the amount of data on which to base analysis is small.  Figure 5 displays tsunamis 
which have been recorded along the WCATWC Pacific AOR.  One way to expand the data set is to 
use historic data from other areas in addition to the region of interest.  NOAA’s National Geophysical 
Data Center (NGDC) compiles a historic tsunami database which can be used for this purpose (NGDC 
2007).  Tsunami amplitudes in the database have been compared to sea level records when available 
and updated as necessary.  
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     Modeling  hypothetical  events  can  also  help  define  procedures.    For  example,  Knight  (2006) 
showed by modeling potential events in the Atlantic Basin, Caribbean Sea, and Gulf of Mexico that 
events in the Atlantic will not pose a threat to the Gulf of Mexico and vice-versa.  This type of study 
is particularly helpful in areas with little historic tsunami information. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Events which have produced tsunamis recorded in the WCATWC Pacific AOR (NGDC, 2007).   Spheres 
are located at the event’s source location with a size related to the maximum recorded amplitude or runup within 
the AOR.  The sphere color relates to the event’s year of occurrence. 
 
     There  are  some  pitfalls  in  using  modeling  to  base  criteria  for  local  events.    Most  sub-sea 
earthquakes  less  than  or  near  magnitude  7.5  do  not  trigger  significant  tsunamis.    However, 
occasionally a major tsunami will be triggered by an earthquake in this range (e.g., 1998 Papua New 
Guinea, 1994 Java, and 2006 Java, etc).  For these events, models computed using the expected sea 
floor displacement will normally show a non-dangerous wave about an order of magnitude less in size 
than the actual wave produced.  The larger waves have been attributed to many phenomena, such as 
associated  landslides,  slow  slip,  and  slip  on  splay  faults  through  the  accretionary  wedge  (e.g., 
associated landslides - Tappin et al. 2001; slow slip – Kanamori and Kikuchi 1993; slip through 
accretionary wedge – Fukao 1977).   
     Regardless of the reason for these larger than expected waves, criteria for local events can not be 
set only by forward modeling from earthquake sources.   Criteria must be set conservatively enough 
so that the odds of a dangerous local event not falling within the warning category are very low. 
     Several  earthquake  source  characteristics  influence  whether  a  tsunami  is  generated  by  an 
earthquake  
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and how large an area it may affect.  The most obvious is earthquake size, or magnitude.  Earthquake 
size can also be estimated by other features such as fault length, width, or slip. These other parameters 
are not known to the center analysts within the time frame necessary to issue the first message.  There 
is  little  time  for  analysis  during  that  first  message  output,  so  criteria  must  be  kept  as  simple  as 
reasonably possible. 
     Other  earthquake  source  factors  which  can  influence  the  likelihood  of  tsunami  generation  are 
earthquake  location  (onshore  distance,  relationship  to  tectonic  features,  and  depth  of  water  at 
epicenter), hypocentral depth, and the earthquake fault mechanism.  All of these characteristics can 
influence how large an area can be affected by a wave if one is generated.   
      The  influence  of  earthquake  source  parameters  on  tsunami  generation  is  examined  using  the 
NGDC tsunami database.  Table 2 compares hypocentral depth versus tsunami generation.  Large, 
deep earthquakes are unusual in the AOR, so there is not much historical data for the AOR only.   
Table 2 includes all tsunamis throughout the entire planet since 1900 with amplitude 0.5m or over, 
and shows the percentage of occurrence at different hypocentral depth ranges.     
 
Hypocentral 
Depth (km) 
Number Tsunamis (entire database 
since 1900) 
% of total 
tsunamis 
 Total # of earthquakes since 
1900; M >= 7 
< 50  343  90%  1300 
50-100  35  9%  140 
> 100  2  <1%  70 
Table 2. Tsunami generation versus depth.  Tsunamis included are all high-validity events worldwide since 1900 
with amplitude greater than 0.5m.  The last column shows the estimated total number of events over magnitude 7 
for each depth range in this time period based on an extrapolation of the USGS Preliminary Determination of 
Epicenters catalog (2007). 
 
     Table 2 shows that the likelihood of tsunami generation by earthquakes greater than 100km depth 
is  very  low.    However,  earthquakes  in  the  range  50km  to  100km  produce  a  sizeable  portion  of 
significant tsunamis.  Results from this table support the international tsunami standard of not issuing 
tsunami warnings for earthquakes over 100km in depth except in cases where the size, depth, and 
location of the quake indicate possible rupture to shallow depths.  
     Table 3 compares earthquake magnitude with tsunami generation.  Magnitudes are grouped by 
existing WCATWC criteria levels which match international standards.   
Magnitude  Total number of 
earthquakes (U.S. west 
coast, BC, and Alaska) 
in potential tsunami 
generation areas (1900-
2004) 
Number of 
events which 
produced a 
tsunami >= 
0.5m amp.  
Maximum 
amplitude 
(m) 
Maximum 
“reach” – max. 
epicentral 
distance with 
recorded amp. 
>= 0.5m (km) 
Percentage of 
occurrence 
5.0-5.9  3549  1  3  16  0.028% 
6.0-6.4  422  0       0% 
6.5-7.0  266  2  2.2  28  0.75% 
7.1-7.5  55  3  3  146  5.5% 
7.6-7.8  10  2  1+  870  20% 
7.9+  13  7  525  Tele-tsunamis  59% 
Table  3.  Tsunami  generation  versus  magnitude  within  the  WCATWC  AOR.    Earthquakes  of  all  depths  are 
included in this table.   Note: Three earthquakes M > 8.5 have occurred in the region since 1900 and all three 
triggered basin-wide tsunamis. 
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Figure 6. Warning criteria for events inside the WCATWC AOR. 
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Figure 7. Warning criteria for events outside the WCATWC AOR. 
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Data in Table 3 show the general trend that the higher the earthquake magnitude, the more likely a 
tsunami will be generated.  Also, the higher the magnitude, the further away from the epicenter the 
wave  may  be  dangerous.    Data  on  this  table  support  keeping  warning  zones  small  for  events 
magnitude 7.5 and below, and increasing the geographic extent with magnitude. WCATWC response 
criteria corresponding to the magnitude ranges given in Table 3 are shown in the flow charts  in 
Figures 6 and 7. 
     Earthquake fault mechanism also influences tsunami generation.  Intuitively, it might seem that 
events with horizontal fault motion should not produce tsunamis as little sea floor is vertically moved.  
However, Knight (2006) and Geist and Parsons (2005) showed that earthquakes with horizontal fault 
motion can produce significant tsunamis.  Potential generation mechanisms include triggering of sub-
aerial or sub-marine landslides, horizontal motion of an inclined sea floor, and slip vector obliqueness. 
Table 4 summarizes strike-slip events which produced large tsunamis from 1977 to 2004.  Fault 
parameters are taken from the Global Centroid Moment Tensor Project Database (2007).  Of the 
nearly 4000 earthquakes listed in the database, 109 produced a tsunami and 41 of those produced 
tsunamis  greater  than  1m  amplitude.    Of  those 41  events,  5  (12%)  were  triggered  by  strike  slip 
earthquakes (with slip vectors within 20 degrees of horizontal). 
 
Event Date  Region  Magnitude   Maximum 
amplitude 
(m) 
“Reach” – max. 
epicentral 
distance with 
recorded amp. 
>= 0.5m (km) 
Notes 
9/12/1979  Irian Jaya  7.5  2.0  75    
1/21/1994  Indonesia  6.9  2.0  30    
10/8/1994  Indonesia  6.8  3.0  10  1 death 
11/14/1994  Philippines  7.1  7.2  35  24 deaths 
10/10/2002  Irian Jaya  7.5  4.0  75  Flooding 
Table 4. Strike slip earthquakes which produced significant tsunamis in the period from 1977 to 2004 (Knight, 
2006).   
 
     Table 4 shows that strike slip events can cause tsunamis, though, all of these earthquakes were 
located near the coast.  In each case, the event was located within 25km of the coastline the tsunami 
impacted.   
     Based on the information given in Tables 3 and 4 and the high likelihood of strike slip events 
occurring far offshore the Pacific Northwest coastline, events in the magnitude range 7.1-7.5 and 
located far offshore will trigger the issuance of an advisory for nearby coasts.  Those located near 
shore will trigger the issuance of a warning.  The definition of zones which trigger warning versus 
advisory in the 7.1 to 7.5 magnitude range is defined by an examination of the tectonic environment, 
and is normally based on distance ocean-ward from the trench.  Figure 8 shows the warning/advisory 
boundary for the Cascadia subduction zone region. 
     An interesting strike slip event not shown on Table 4 which occurred in the WCATWC AOR is the 
1987, M=7.8, Gulf of Alaska event. This event triggered an observable wave in Yakutat, Alaska of 
0.4m amplitude.  The event occurred well onto the oceanic plate, far from any inclined features or 
slopes expected to slide, but still produced a near-dangerous-amplitude wave.  Based on the  
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procedures listed in Figure 6, a warning would be issued for this event to areas within 500km and an 
advisory  to  areas  from  500km  to  1000km  distant.    Appendix  A  shows  the  distribution  of 
warning/watch/advisory areas for this event and other historic events using both the criteria listed in 
this report and criteria used at the time of the event.   
 
 
Figure 8.  Line dividing offshore magnitude 7.1 to 7.5 earthquakes (which trigger advisories) from near shore 
earthquakes (which generate warnings) in the Cascadia subduction zone region.  Historic earthquakes are shown 
with red dots. 
 
     Criteria relating to epicentral distance from the coast for on-shore events are also provided in 
Figure 6.  The distances vary with magnitude and are relevant for epicenters located on the North 
American mainland.  Epicenters located on islands such as Kodiak and Vancouver are treated as 
offshore events.   
     There  are a few examples of on-shore  events which have produced tsunamis.   The two main 
reasons that an on-shore event can trigger a tsunami are: 1) the fault rupture extends under the ocean 
(e.g., 1964 Alaska quake and 1906 San Francisco quake), and 2) strong shaking induces a sub-aerial 
or sub-marine landslide (e.g., 1989 Loma Prieta).  
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     Table 5 summarizes on-shore events in the AOR which have triggered tsunamis.  Since 1900, 37 
known tsunamis have been generated in the AOR.  Seven of these were generated by events with an 
epicenter on land.  
 
Table 5. Onshore events in the WCATWC AOR which have triggered a tsunami (NGDC, 2007).   
 
Event Date  Region  Magnitude   Maximum 
amplitude (m) 
Epicentral 
distance from 
coast (km) 
Cause 
6/23/1946  Vancouver I.  7.3  3 (?)  10  Landslide 
4/13/1949  Washington  7.0  2.2  2  Landslide 
7/10/1958  Alaska  8.2  525  1  Landslide 
3/28/1964  Alaska  9.2  67  2  Extended fault 
rupture and 
landslides 
2/28/1979  Alaska  7.4  0.1  65  Ice fall (?) 
10/18/1989  California  6.9  1  3  Landslide 
4/25/1992  California  7.2  0.9  4  Extended  fault 
rupture 
 
     The events in Table 5 indicate that sources have to be near the coast to trigger a tsunami.  The 
1964 event is a little misleading, though.  It was located within 2km of the ocean, but next to a fjord 
which extended well into the mainland.  The fault rupture (and tsunami source zone) extended several 
hundred kilometers seaward from the epicenter.   
     The distance an earthquake ruptures is roughly related to its magnitude.  Several studies have 
developed rupture length versus magnitude relationships.  All these relationships are best fits to the 
observed data  and do not provide  an accurate estimate for all events.  Papazachos, et al. (2004) 
separated the relationship into strike slip, continental dip slip, and subduction dip slip categories.  
Table  6  summarizes  expected  fault  length  for  these  categories.    These  values  could  be  used  as 
guidelines as they would limit how far an event could be from the coast and still directly disturb the 
sea floor (if the hypocenter is located near one end of a rupture zone). 
 
Table 6. Expected rupture length for various size earthquakes and tectonic settings (Papazachos et al., 2004). 
 
Magnitude  Fault Type   Expected Rupture Length (km) 
7.0   Strike Slip  67 
7.0  Continental Dip Slip  44 
7.0  Subduction Zone Dip Slip  46 
7.5  Strike Slip  133 
7.5  Continental Dip Slip  78 
7.5  Subduction Zone Dip Slip  86 
7.8  Strike Slip  200 
7.8  Continental Dip Slip  110 
7.8  Subduction Zone Dip Slip  126 
8.0  Strike Slip  263 
8.0  Continental Dip Slip  138 
8.0  Subduction Zone Dip Slip  162 
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    Tables 5 and 6 provide much different sets of guidelines for onshore earthquake criteria.  Using the 
fault lengths in Table 6 as a guide would lead to over-warning based on the history shown in Table 5.  
Another factor which could help a TWC analyst in certain cases is the ShakeMaps produced by the 
Advanced National Seismic System (ANSS).  For many areas of the United States, ShakeMaps are 
quickly distributed by the ANSS and available at the WCATWC shortly after initial bulletin issuance.  
Further work is necessary to integrate ShakeMaps fully into tsunami warning center operations. 
 
      Onshore distance guidelines are set conservatively based on the history in Table 5.  Following 
initial message issuance, the analyst would attempt to verify that fault rupture has not extended to sea 
by using the ShakeMap, fault mechanism, and/or nearby sea level data (upgrading the message if 
necessary).    As  specified  in  the  Figure  6  flowchart,  one  exception  to  the  distance  rule  is  major 
(magnitude 7.9+) onshore earthquakes in a subduction zone.  These will prompt a warning even if the 
hypocenter is greater than the set distance from the coast.   
     Based on the discussion above and information in Tables 2 through 6, warning criteria for events 
inside and outside the WCATWC AOR are given in a flowchart form in Figures 6 and 7.  These 
criteria have several differences from the previous criteria used at the center: 
 
•  Hypocentral depth is included, 
•  Geographical warning extent is generally reduced, 
•  Special procedures are set for regions not well-connected to the open ocean, 
•  For  events  magnitude  7.9+,  warning/advisory  areas  are  based  on  threat  level  from  pre-
computed models instead of tsunami travel times, 
•  The new advisory product is included in the criteria,  
•  Advisories are issued for far-offshore events in the lower magnitude ranges, and  
•  For onshore events, distance from the coast is specified. 
 
     Operationally, basing the warning extent on modeled threat level versus tsunami travel times for 
events magnitude 7.9 and greater is a significant change.  Recent improvements in modeling and sea 
level data acquisition make this change possible.  The new DART array provides data to the TWC 
which allows the center to forecast impact for distant events well before wave impact along the AOR 
coast.  The new criteria take advantage of this array by only issuing immediate warnings/advisories to 
areas that could be affected within three hours of the event.  Within this three-hour region, only areas 
that pre-computed tsunami models indicate will be threatened are put into a warning or advisory.  If 
no threat analysis is available for a source, warnings/advisories will be issued to all AOR coasts 
within three hours travel time until recorded sea level data allows cancellation or restriction of the 
warning/advisory. 
     Threatened areas are defined by using tsunami models (Titov and Gonzalez 1997, Whitmore and 
Sokolowski 1996).  Models are computed for different magnitude events at subduction zones around 
the Pacific basin which could threaten the AOR.  Based on the amplitudes computed, the region of the 
AOR threatened in each model is defined.  During an event, the most appropriate model is selected 
and its threatened area is compared with travel times to determine the region placed in a warning or 
advisory.   
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For example, during the November 15, 2006 Kuril Islands event, warnings were issued for regions of 
the Aleutian Islands within three hours of the wave front until a forecast could be made (based on  
procedures of the time).  Areas east to Sand Point, AK were eventually included in warnings.  Pre-
computed, unscaled models forecasted minor waves (0.12m and less) east of Adak in Alaska, and 
moderate waves (0.2m to 0.4m) from Adak west to Attu.  Under the new procedures, the region from 
Adak to Attu would have been issued an immediate advisory which would not have expanded to the 
east unless observed wave heights indicated otherwise (Figure A4).  The region from Adak to Attu 
was  the  only  region  in  Alaska  that  models  forecasted  an  advisory  level  impact  (0.3m  to  1.0m).  
Warnings and advisories for areas along the west coast would be based on a forecast calibrated with 
observed sea level heights.  
    Warning, watch, and advisory areas are delineated by known break points.  These break points are 
listed below. 
Attu, AK  Yakutat, AK     Cape Blanco, OR 
Adak, AK  Sitka, AK     Oregon-California Border 
Nikolski, AK  Langara Island, BC     Cape Mendocino, CA 
Dutch Harbor, AK  Northern Tip Vancouver Island, BC  Point Reyes, CA 
Sand Point, AK  Washington-BC Border    Point Sur, CA 
Kodiak, AK  Clatsop Spit, OR     Point Conception, CA 
Seward, AK  Cascade Head, OR    California-Mexico Border 
Cordova, AK 
 
    The flow chart in Figure 6 lists four areas which have special procedures (Bering Sea, Cook Inlet, 
Puget Sound/Strait of Georgia, and San Francisco Bay).  Figure 9 depicts the Puget Sound special 
procedure area.  Tsunamis generated in these areas are expected to be confined to the source region 
only.    Warning  zones  are  pre-determined  for  events  that  occur  within  the  specified  region  and 
magnitude range.  These zones are based on a study of potential sources and wave propagation for 
each region.  For example, a magnitude 7.1 or greater earthquake located east of Russia in the Bering 
Sea would prompt a warning for the Pribilof Islands, and the Aleutian Islands from False Pass to Attu.  
Another example is the Puget Sound special procedural region for earthquakes in the magnitude range 
7.1 to 7.5 (Figure 9).  Earthquakes within this magnitude range and region would prompt a warning 
for the Puget Sound and Strait of Juan de Fuca and not the outer coast. 
    
 
Figure 9. Puget Sound special procedure region.  
 
Science of Tsunami Hazards, Vol. 27, No. 2, page 17 (2008)  
 
  
 
  
 
     The  seismic-based  criteria  given  on  the  left  sides  of  Figures  6  and  7  are  for  initial  message 
issuance.    Supplemental  messages  can  be  further  guided  by  fault  mechanism  analysis,  ANSS 
ShakeMaps, and slow earthquake discrimination by energy versus moment comparisons if sea level 
data and associated forecasts are not available. 
 
 
6. FUTURE WORK 
     Warning criteria refinement is an ongoing process.   Continued  collaboration between warning 
centers, research agencies, and emergency management through channels such as the U.S. National 
Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (Bernard 2005) are necessary to keep criteria up-to-date with the 
latest knowledge and emergency management response capabilities.  New observational data sets, 
processing techniques, and basic hazard research must be incorporated into the criteria as they become 
available.  Some ideas to address are: 
•  Utilize USGS ShakeMap and mechanism products and slope stability analysis to determine 
areas at highest risk of landslide tsunami generation, 
•  Improve near source tsunami observations and corresponding forecast models, 
•  Incorporate  real  time  GPS/accelerometer  data  streams  to  improve  finite  fault  parameter 
determinations, and 
•  Investigate  seismic  techniques  which  help  discriminate  earthquakes  likely  to  generate  a 
tsunami from those that are not. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Four examples are provided below which show the initial warning/ watch/ advisory status for historic 
events.  Both the status using criteria in use at the time of the event and the criteria given in this report 
are shown. 
 
Example 1: 
1987 M=7.8 Gulf of Alaska 
 
 
Figure A1: Initial Warning/Watch/Advisory extent for the 
1987 Gulf of Alaska event.  The left side shows the actual extent of the initial alert and the right shows the extent 
under the criteria listed in this report. Warning areas in red; advisory in grey, watch in yellow; information only in 
green. 
 
 
Example 2: 
1997 M=7.8 Kamchatka 
 
 
Figure  A2:  Initial  Warning/Watch/Advisory  extent  for  the 
1997 Kamchatka event.  The left side shows the actual extent of the initial alert and the right shows the extent 
under the criteria listed in this report. Warning areas in red; advisory in grey, watch in yellow; information only in 
green. 
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Example 3: 
2005 M=7.2 Gorda Plate 
 
 
 
Figure A3: Initial Warning/Watch/Advisory extent for the 2005 Gorda plate event.  The left side shows the actual 
extent of the initial alert and the right shows the extent under the criteria listed in this report. Warning areas in 
red; advisory in grey, watch in yellow; information only in green. 
 
 
Example 4: 
2006 M=8.3 Kuril Islands 
 
 
 
Figure A4: Initial Warning/Watch/Advisory extent for the 2006 Kuril Islands event.  The left side shows the actual 
extent of the initial alert and the right shows the extent under the criteria listed in this report. Warning areas in 
red; advisory in grey, watch in yellow; information only in green. 
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